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The Role of the IMF in
Future Sovereisin Debt Restructurinas
Report of the Annenberg House
Expert Group
A one-day meeting of international finance and insolvency
experts was held on November 2, 2013 at the Annenberg House in Santa
Monica, California. The meeting was co-hosted by the University of
Southern California Gould School of Law and the Annenberg Retreat at
Sunnylands. The participants at the meeting are listed in Attachment A to
this Report.
The topic of the meeting was "The Role of the IMF in
Future Sovereign Debt Restructurings." An agenda (copy attached as
Attachment B) was circulated to the participants prior to the meeting.
The goal of the meeting was to solicit the views of a
diverse group of experts on the practical implications of the IMF 's April
26, 2013 paper captioned "Sovereign Debt Restructuring -- Recent
Developments and Implications for the Fund's Legal and Policy
Framework" (the "April 26 Paper"). The April 26 Paper may signal a
major shift in IMF policies in the area of sovereign debt workouts. A
number of the proposals in the April 26 Paper are likely to be
controversial and the IMF Executive Board has instructed the Fund staff
to prepare more detailed analyses of these issues. The University of
Southern California Gould School of Law invited the participants in the
Expert Group to provide an independent assessment of the desirability
and feasibility of some of the key recormmendations in the April 26
Paper. *
*Participants provided their views strictly in their personal capacities and not as representatives of
their respective institutions.
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The Paragraph 32 Proposals
Although the Expert Group discussed a number of the
ideas contained in the April 26 Paper, attention focused in particular on
paragraph 32 of that paper. This paragraph reads as follows:
32. There may be a case for exploring additional
ways to limit the risk that Fund resources will
simply be used to bail out private creditors. For
example, a presumption could be established that
some form of a creditor bail-in measure would be
implemented as a condition for Fund lending in
cases where, although no clear-cut determination
has been made that the debt is unsustainable, the
member has lost market access and prospects for
regaining market access are uncertain. In such
cases, the primary objective of creditor bail-in
would be designed to ensure that creditors would
not exit during the period while the Fund is
providing financial assistance. This would also give
more time for the Fund to determine whether the
problem is one of liquidity or solvency.
Accordingly, the measures would typically involve
a rescheduling of debt, rather than the type of debt
stock reduction that is normally required in
circumstances where the debt is judged to be
unsustainable. Providing the member with a more
comfortable debt profile would also have the
additional benefit of enhancing market confidence
in the feasibility of the member's adjustment
efforts, thereby reducing the risk that the debt will,
in fact, become unsustainable. While bail-in
measures would be voluntary (ranging from
rescheduling of loans to bond exchanges that result
in long maturities), creditors would understand that
the success of such measures would be a condition
for continued Fund support for the adjustment
measures. Such a strategy-debt rescheduling
instead of debt reduction-would not be appropriate
when it is clear that the problem is one of solvency
in which case reducing debt upfront to address debt
overhang and restore sustainability would be the
preferred course of action.
This Report will summarize the consensus views1 of the
Expert Group on the practical implications of the suggestions contained
in paragraph 32 of the April 26 Paper.
Background
Debtor countries normally approach the IMF for financial
assistance only when they have lost market access and exhausted other
means of financing. By the time the Fund is consulted, the private capital
markets will have reached a collective judgment that someone -- perhaps
everyone -- is at risk of losing money in the debtor country (let us call
that country "Debtorania"). Markets can, of course, be wrong in these
judgments. Investors may turn skittish for a number of reasons that are
unrelated to the economic fundamentals of Debtorania. These may
include a reaction to the misbehavior or misfortune of a sovereign debtor
elsewhere in the world, adversity in the global financial picture generally,
a significant shift in interest rates, a currency crisis, an unexpected (and
alarming) political development in Debtorania or elsewhere, and so forth.
Skittish markets can be characterized by a herd mentality;
individual investors exiting primarily because they see other investors
exiting. Herds are no doubt occasionally spooked needlessly, but there
must also be times when the herd -- or the more discerning members of
the herd -- have sensed the presence of a pride of lions in the tall grass. It
may be difficult for the IMF to know in every case whether Debtorania's
loss of private market access is the result of baseless alarms or whether
the market may have correctly diagnosed a serious problem with the
sustainability of Debtorania' s stock of debt.
Fund programs that involve advancing the full amount
needed to cover anticipated budget deficits and to repay, in full and on
time, all items of debt maturing during the program period effectively
prejudge the outcome of this question. 2Should Debtorania's problems
indeed prove to be structural and chronic (and the loss of market access
certainly raises a fair suspicion in this regard), any new official sector
loans that repay private sector creditors at par only shift the risk of an
eventual debt restructuring onto the shoulders of the official sector.
There are only three tactical options for the Fund at the
outset of an adjustment program where the medium term debt
sustainability of the member country is in doubt:
1Opinions of individual members of the Expert Group on certain issues sometimes differed.
2 With the sole exception of the belated debt restructuring in Greece in 2012, this has been the model
used in the Eurozone debt crisis that began in early 20 10.
1. Lend the country the amount needed to repay in full all
obligations maturing during the program period (a
"Full Bailout"),
2. Require a full restructuring (affecting principal/interest
and maturity) of the country's debt at the outset of the
program in order to remove any doubt about the
sustainability of that debt stock (a "Pre-eMptive
Restructuring"), or
3. Require a milder form of restructuring that pushes
maturities out of the program period without imposing
principal or interest rate haircuts (a "Reprofiling").
Option 1 shifts the risk of an eventual debt restructuring
onto the official sector and allows the original creditors to escape
unscathed. Option 2 may force a sovereign debtor into a painful and
unnecessary debt restructuring, bruising the debtor's reputation in the
capital markets for years to come. That leaves Option 3, a Reprofiling --
a temporizing measure to be sure but one that preserves the status quo
until a more informed judgment can be made about the likely depth and
duration of the country's problems.
The Reprofiling Option
The Expert Group broadly agrees with the suggestion in
paragraph 32 of the April 26 Paper that in certain situations Fund
programs should presume the need for a stretch out of maturing debt to
remove those liabilities from the program period. This presumption,
however, should be rebuttable. In cases where the Fund staff is confident
that the debtor country is experiencing only a temporary liquidity
problem, an adjustment to the repayment profile will not be necessary and
should not be undertaken. The Expert Group discussed the advisability of
also recognizing an exception for unusual circumstances (such as a clear
and present danger of regional contagion), but decided that the IMF
would frequently be pressured to avoid or defer a needed Reprofiling on
the grounds of "unusual circumstances". There will always be interested
parties who will argue that the path of least resistance and risk is a full
bailout and the Fund's record of resisting pressure from its larger
shareholders in areas where the Fund has discretion is not encouraging.
The consensus of the Expert Group was therefore not to recommend an
"lunusual circumstances" exemption from the presumptive need for a
Reprofiling.
The consensus of the Expert Group was that a Reprofiling
should normally affect all outstanding bonds of the debtor country, even
those maturing after the program is scheduled to end. Imposing the
discomfort of the Reprofiling only on the sovereign's short-dated paper
would be inconsistent with the goal of intercreditor equity. Moreover,
unless the entire curve is pushed out evenly, the reprofiled bonds could,
on their new termns, mature at the same time as some of the untouched
instruments, possibly producing an unhealthy spike in the debt profile in
the first few years after the program ends.
As for the length of the Reprofiling stretch out, the Expert
Group felt this would normally be 3-5 years but should reflect the Fund's
assessment of the period required for the fiscal adjustment measures to
restore the country to perceived creditworthiness. The stretching out of
maturities for 3-5 years will allow the Fund to assess the situation and the
country's progress toward economic adjustment. If it turns out that the
situation deteriorates or the Fund's initial projections are shown to have
been too optimistic, preparations can then be made to implement a more
severe form of debt restructuring.
The objectives of a presumptive need for Reprofiling the
debt stock of a member country that has lost market access are:
1 . Reduce the call on Fund resources. First and foremost,
a Reprofiling obviates the need for the Fund to
advance money that immediately bleeds out to repay
existing creditors at par. In most cases, this will
significantly reduce the size of the official sector
rescue package.
2. Allow time for diagnosis. A Reprofiling will take
Debtorania out of the market for the period of the
stretch out. This will give the Fund time to assess the
depth of the problem and the likelihood that the fiscal
adjustment measures will succeed in restoring the
country to a sustainable position.
3. Allow time for adjustment measures to take hold.
Because Debtorania will not again have to face market
scrutiny until the stretch out period ends, the country's
fiscal adjustment measures will have time to take hold
and show the results that the market would expect to
see before lending is resumed.
4. Lock in the private sector. While Debtorania's bonds
will continue to trade in the market during the
Reprofiling period, the important point is that they will
remain in the hands of private sector investors. In the
event that adjustment efforts fail and a deeper
restructuring becomes necessary, the restructuring
burden will be shared equally by all private sector
creditors. A migration of the liabilities from the
private sector to the official sector of the kind we have
seen in the Eurozone periphery will thus be avoided.
6. Allow time to hedge. An institutional investor that felt
itself overexposed to Debtorania and did not wish to
risk the possibility of a full blown restructuring after
the Reprofiling period ends, can use the period of the
stretch out to sell or hedge its position in an orderly
manner.
7. Debtor counptr incentives. Everyone will know that a
failure to regain market access when the stretch out
period ends may force a more severe debt restructuring
at that point. This knowledge should create an
additional incentive for Debtorania to stick with its
fiscal adjustment program.
Risk and Risk Mitigants
1 . Collateral damage. All sovereign debt restructurings,
even mild ones, exact a cost. That cost will take the
form of a bruised credit reputation for some period of
time, deferred reaccess to voluntary markets, higher
borrowing costs for both the sovereign and its local
corporate issuers and so forth. Putting moral hazard
concerns aside, if the eventual costs of a Reprofiling
could be calibrated and balanced against the eventual
costs of the other two options -- a Full Bailout or a Pre-
emptive Restructuring -- a completely enlightened
decision maker would be able to choose the optimal
path, at least in a utilitarian sense. But that will never
happen. The counterfactual is never a matter of proof,
only speculation.
That said, empirical studies suggest that milder forms
of debt restructuring which do not involve outright
principal haircuts are forgotten and forgiven by the
markets more rapidly. 3 The reason? Like true love, a
principal haircut is forever. But a simple deferral of
principal repayment allows the creditor to benefit from
the uptick in market value of the paper if and when the
sovereign's fortunes begin to improve. The classic
3See Juan J. Cruces & Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts, 85 Am. ECON.
J. 85 (2013).
example of a sovereign debt reprofihing -- Uruguay in
2003 -- was followed by a new, entirely voluntary,
bond issue by Uruguay just 3 1 days after the
reprofiling of the country's existing bonds closed in
May of that year.
2. Self-fulfilling runs. The second major concern is that
the market, faced with the high likelihood of a
mandatory maturity extension at the outset of a Fund-
prescribed adjustment program, could dump the
country's bonds prematurely.
The consensus of the Expert Group was that this risk
could be managed by designing the policy in such a
way as to treat loss of market access as a necessary but
not sufficient condition for Reprofiling. Reprofiling
would occur only in situations in which the
fundamentals of the country -- debt levels, primary
deficits, and other variables that do not react to market
panics -- indicate that the country's debt may well be
unsustainable. This rules out a vicious circle between
expectations of reprofiling and actual reprofiling.
This is not to say that the presence of a reprofiling
policy may not lead to an earlier loss of market access.
Indeed, the express purpose of the policy is to
discourage private sector lending to countries with
doubtful debt sustainability on the assumption that the
official sector will be there to bail them out
completely. Provided that the criteria for reprofiling
are defined sufficiently conservatively, earlier loss of
market access could actually be a desirable
consequence of the policy. Mistakes will no doubt
occasionally be made, in both directions -- both
unnecessary reprofiling of debts, and failing to
reprofile debts when this would have been appropriate.
But this is preferable to the current situation, in which
mistakes tend to all go in the same direction and debt
restructurings tend to occur too late, forcing far larger
costs on the country and far greater losses on the
remaining creditors.
Holdouts
The word "reprofiling" is deliberately euphonious. In
truth, a Reprofiling is one species under the broader genus
"restructuring". And a debt restructuring is just a polite way of saying
that the obligations will not be performed according to their original
terms, which is itself merely a delicate way of describing a default.
The sentiment expressed in the penultimate sentence of
paragraph 32 of the April 26 paper (to the effect that Reprofilings will be
"voluntary" and supported by creditors out of enlightened self-interest) is,
in the consensus view of the Expert Group, optimistic. Telling a member
country that it will be expected to Reprofile its debt as a condition to IMF
support is tantamount to telling the country that it must default on that
debt. It is fatuous to believe that all creditors will voluntarily accept even
a mild stretch out of their claims. There will be holdouts. 4 The IMF has
been notoriously timid in confronting this disagreeable fact of financial
life, often hiding behind an informal policy of "never telling a member to
default." The Expert Group felt that perhaps the time had come for the
Fund to call a spade a shovel.
A presumptive policy of Reprofiling will require the IMF
to form a view about the appropriate treatment of holdouts from the
Reprofiling exercise. Perhaps at some point in the future aggregated
collective action clauses will deal with the holdout creditor problem, but
that day is years down the road. For now, there are things the IMF could
do to assist member countries in addressing the risks posed by holdout
creditors. 5 A good starting point might be a candid admission that a
Reprofiling policy will inevitably force member countries to confront the
holdout problem.
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4~ As the April 26 paper notes, the recent apparent success of holdout creditors in Argentina and the
decision of the Greek Government to pay holdouts from its 2012 restructuring in full, make holdout
behavior in future sovereign debt restructurings more likely.
5 Some of these options are discussed in a recent Brookings Institution Report, available at
htti)://papers.ssmn.com/sol3/naipers.cftn?abstract id=2354998
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Background reading:
1 . IMF paper, "Sovereign Debt Restructuring -- Recent
Developments and Implications for the Fund's Legal and Policy
Framework" (April 26, 2013) (referred to below as "Recent
Developments").
2. IMF Paper, "Greece -- Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access
Under the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement" (May 20, 2013)
(referred to below as "Ex Post Evaluation").
3. "IMF Document Excerpts: Disagreements Revealed", Wall Street
Journal (Oct 7, 2013).
4. Schadler, "Unsustainable Debt and the Political Economy of
Lending: Constraining the IMF's Role in Sovereign Debt
Crises", CIGI Working Paper # 19 (Oct 2013).
5. Salmon, "The IMF Revisits Sovereign Bankruptcy" Reuters (Oct
21, 2013).
* * * *
9:5 amWelcomingz remarks
9:30 - 10:50 am Too Little and Too Late
Introduction
Roundtable discussion (all participants)
" How serious is the "too little and too late" problem
discussed in paragraphs 2 1-33 of the Recent Developments
paper?
" Should the Fund be given tools to pressure a debtor country
into action earlier in the process?
* In practical terms, what can the Fund do to curtail the
procrastination of debtor country authorities in
commencing a needed debt rearrangement?
* To avoid the "too little" problem should the Fund openly
prescribe the level of required debt relief early in the
process?
* Should the Fund refuse to support a country that has asked
for, or received, insufficient debt relief (in the Fund's
opinion)?
* Should the Fund adopt (and publicly announce) objective
criteria by which debt sustainability will be assessed (e±g., a
target debt to GDP ratio as was done in the case of Greece
2012)?
* Is it appropriate for the Fund to suggest, or to accept, a
differentiated treatment among private sector creditor
groups (e.g., less severe restructuring terms for domestic
financial institutions so as not to aggravate a local banking
crisis)? What about retail investors? .
" Should the Fund offer a financial inducement (such as
longer maturities) for countries that address their debt
problems sooner rather than later?
" Is the Fund equipped to withstand political pressures to
defer a needed debt restructuring?
" Are fears of regional contagion, and the effect of a debt
restructuring on banks located in important creditor
countries, factors that should be taken into account in
9:15 am
deciding whether to defer or cancel a needed debt
restructuring?
10:50 - 1 1:00.amr Summary of discussion
11:00-l11:30Oam Coffee
11:30 - 12:50 pm Bailing Out Private Sector Lenders
Introduction
Roundtable discussion (all participants)
* Are there ever circumstances in which Fund resources
should be made available to repay in full and on time a
debtor country's private sector lenders, other than in cases
where country is (indisputably) facing only liquidity
problems? See paragraph 31 of Ex Post Evaluation.
* Should there be a standard operating procedure for
requiring, at the very least, a deferral of maturities of
private sector debt during a program period?
* Should loss of market access be the presumptive trigger for
such a mandatory stretch out?
* In some cases, this policy may force the debtor country into
default on its existing debt. Should the Fund be more
aggressive in supporting member countries in resisting
demands of holdout creditors?
* What policy should the Fund adopt when other official
sector lenders (such as neighboring countries) are prepared
to lend the debtor country the money to repay private sector
lenders in full? Should the IMF countenance such lending
on the condition that the other official sector lenders
acknowledge the Fund's preferred creditor status over such
loans?
12:50 - 1:00 pm Summary of discussion
1:00 -2:00 pm Lunch
2:00 - 3:20 pm The Fund's Role in Private Sector Debt Renegotiations
Introduction
Roundtable discussion (all participants)
* Should the Fund invite private sector or independent
academic input on its debt sustainability analysis?
" Should the Fund be prepared to give a formal seal of
approval to the restructuring terms being offered to private
sector creditors?
* Should the Fund jettison its pretense of "neutrality" in a
debtor country's negotiation with private sector lenders?
* Should the Lending Into Arrears policy be amended (e±g.,
to give greater clarity to the "negotiating in good faith"
concept)?
" Should the Fund encourage or discourage the formation
and operation of creditor committees?
" Has the time come to formalize the Fund's Preferred
Creditor Status ("Em"')? If so, in what way and with what
legal consequences?
3:20 - 3:30 pm Summary of discussion
3:30 - 4:00 pm Coffee
4:00 - 5:20 pm The IMF and the Holdout Creditor Problem
Introduction
Roundtable discussion (all participants)
* Should the Fund be more aggressive in promoting
techniques that minimize the holdout creditor problem in
sovereign debt workouts?
* For example, should the Fund encourage/require the
inclusion of enhanced aggregated collective action clauses
in debt instruments of member countries? Should the Fund
discourage the use of pari pass clauses that could give rise
to injunctions requiring ratable payment of holdout
creditors?
" Should the Fund reconsider its traditional bashfulness in
expressing its views to courts considering holdout creditor
litigation?
" Should the Fund sponsor or at least encourage financial
assistance to poor countries facing legal demands from
holdout creditors?
* Should the Fund (or some other IFI) increase technical
assistance to member countries in areas such as the drafting
and negotiation of financial contracts?
5:20 - 5:30 pm Summary of discussion
5:30 Closingz Remarks
